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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020526-CA

:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ann. M. Boyden, Judge, presiding.1
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0) (Supp. 2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, charges pending against a prisoner must
be dismissed if the prisoner is not tried within 120 days of his written request for
disposition. The only exception to this is when there is good cause for the delay. Here,

1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment1' is attached in
Addendum A.

good cause did not support the delay because it was caused by ill-timed State motions
and administrative errors. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the charge?
Standard of Review: Overall, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard to a
trial court's decision about whether to dismiss charges under the 120-day disposition
statute. State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, TJ3, 34 P.3d 790. However, underlying
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and underlying findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error. Id. at ^[4.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 143-48, 271 [2-3].

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issue on
appeal. The Amendment reads, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public t r i a l . . . .
U.S. Const. Amend VI.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution is relevant to the issue on appeal.
The provision reads, in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to have a speedy
public t r i a l . . . .
UT Const, art. I, § 12.
Section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code, "Expert Testimony," is relevant to the issue

2

on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum B.
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, "Disposition of Pending Charge," is
determinative to the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The chronology of events is critical to the issue, so the proceedings are listed in
order as follows:
October 31, 2001

Mr. Houston is taken into custody on
several charges, including aggravated
robbery. R. 6.

November 29, 2001

Mr. Houston is charged by information with
aggravated robbery. R. 3-5.

December 8, 2001

Mr. Houston, while in prison, executes a
"Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charge(s)" for the charge of
aggravated robbery. R. 13.

December 14, 2001

The prison records office receives the
"Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charge(s)" and forwards it to the
Salt Lake City Prosecuting Attorney along
with a "Certificate of Inmate Status." R. 1315.

December 20, 2001

Preliminary hearing is set for January 15,
2002. R. 16.

January 15, 2002

Preliminary hearing begins. After testimony
by two witnesses, hearing is continued to the
following day. R. 255 [44-46].

3

January 16, 2002

Prison fails to transport Mr. Houston to the
court. Hearing continued to January 24 th. Id.
at 46-48.

January 24, 2002

Preliminary hearing is completed. Mr.
Houston is bound over on the charge of
aggravated robbery. IcL at 93-94.
Arraignment is set for February 11, 2002. R.
30.

February 11,2002

Arraignment is continued to allow for
appointment of conflict counsel. R. 259.

February 25, 2002

Mr. Houston is arraigned and pleads not
guilty. R. 260-61. Jury trial is set for March
13-15, 2002. R. 40, 260.

February 27, 2002

The State files a "Notice of Expert Witness."
R. 41-42.

March 11,2002

Pretrial conference is held and, over defense
counsel's objection, trial is postponed until
April 24-26. R. 272 [12-15, 20].

April 12, 2002

The 120-day period afforded the State to
bring Mr. Houston to trial expires. R. 13-15,
85,143,271 [6].

April 18, 2002

The defense counsel files a "Motion to
Dismiss for Violation of Interstate
Agreement on Detainers" and a supporting
memorandum. R. 143-48.

April 22, 2002

A hearing is held on the Motion to Dismiss
and the trial court denies the Motion, ruling
that the delay of the trial was not
unreasonable. R. 271 [7-8].

April 24, 2002

Amended information is filed, and jury trial
begins. R. 151,159.
4

April 26, 2002

Jury trial concludes. The jury returns a
verdict of guilty for aggravated robbery. R.
206.

July 1, 2002

Mr. Houston is sentenced. R. 226-27.

July 9, 2002

Mr. Houston files a timely Notice of
Appeal. R. 228-29.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 23, 2001 Rafael Duran went to Sociables, a State Street bar, with his
friend Al Diaz. R. 256 [105-06]. Mr. Duran had just received rent money from his
tenants, and the money was in his wallet. Id, at 107-08. He also had his cell phone with
him. Id at 107.
At the bar, someone borrowed his phone to make a call. Id. at 12. Then the
borrower passed the phone around to several of his friends, who also made calls. IcL Two
of the borrowers were Mr. Houston and Gabriel Valenzuela. IcL at 136.
During the course of the evening, Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela noticed that
Mr. Duran had a lot of money. Id. They met in the bar's bathroom and agreed to rob Mr.
Duran. Id at 137. Unaware of this, Mr. Duran continued watching his cell phone as it
passed from user to user. Id. at 123-24. Then someone took his phone outside and didn't
return. Id at 124. That person may have been Mr. Houston.2 Or, it may have been Mr.
2

At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Duran could not remember the last person to use his
phone. R. 255 [20]. However, at trial, Mr. Duran indicated that Mr. Houston was the last person
to use his phone. R. 256 [127].
5

Valenzuela.3 Becoming concerned, Mr. Duran went outside. R. 256 [113].
Suddenly, something flew towards his head. R. 255 [10]. After that, he remembers
nothing until he woke up in the hospital about two weeks later. IcL at 10-11. When he
awoke, he found that he had suffered seven knife injuries4 and a head injury. R. 257
[210]. Also, he had undergone surgery to relieve the bleeding on his brain. IcL at 216. His
wallet and cell phone were gone and have never been located. R. 256 [115]. Mr. Duran
himself cannot identify who attacked him, or describe any details of the attack.5
However, witnesses provide some pieces of the puzzle. Immediately after the
attack, several men came outside and found Mr. Duran lying unconscious. The first
people to find him were two unidentified Hispanic men, who found him lying near the
door. R. 257 [221]. One came back inside, shouting, ,f[c]all 911, call 911!" IcL Hearing
this, Scott Talbot, an acquaintance of Mr. Duran's, went outside and saw him lying
unconscious. IdL Mr. Talbot didn't see any blood at first, and so he gently tapped Mr.
Duran's face to wake him up. Id. Mr. Duran did not respond. Id. Then some blood and
saliva starting coming out of his mouth and he "didn't look good at all." IcL at 222. Mr.

3

Apparently, Mr. Valenzuela originally told an investigator that he was in the bar when
Mr. Duran went outside. R. 255 [71]. But at trial, he testified that he was the person who
borrowed the cell phone and went out the door with it. R. 256 [137].
4

The knife injuries include two cuts on his back, three on his upper chest, one on his left
forearm, and one on his left arm. R. 257 [210].
5

R. 256 [114-32]. Mr. Duran did, however, identify Mr. Houston in a photo line-up
prepared by police. State's Ex. 23. He testified that Mr. Houston was the last person to use his
phone. R. 256 [127].
6

Talbot immediately pulled out his cell phone and called 911. Id. 222.
About that time, Mr. Talbot saw a dark-colored Ford Ranger truck speeding down
the alley towards State Street. R. 257 [222-23]. The truck almost ran over Mr. Duran, but
it swerved to miss him. Id at 223. Mr. Talbot saw two people in the truck, but did not get
a good look at them. IcL However, another bar patron, Richard Gates, had a better look.
R. 257 [238]. He testified that he had seen the two men run up to the truck, climb in, and
speed off down the alley. Id. at 238-44. Mr. Gates said that they both looked Hispanic,
and he thought that one of them had blonde hair. IcL at 243-44. But he did not see them
well enough to identify them. Id. at 244.
Mr. Diaz came outside and saw Mr. Duran lying on the ground. R. 256 [164]. He
also saw Mr. Talbot calling for help. R. 256 [165]. The police and ambulance arrived
almost immediately. Id.
The police gathered evidence and witness statements. They spoke with Mr. Diaz
and he told them about the men who had borrowed Mr. Duran's cell phone. R. 256 [162,
165]. He described two of these men. One had been wearing baggy levis, a white knit
shirt with blue sleeves, and two braids in his hair. R. 256 [163]. Mr. Diaz later identified
this man as Mr. Valenzuela. State's ex. 25. The other man was wearing a grey sweatshirt
with "Yankees" written across the front. R. 256 [163]. This man was identified as Mr.
Houston.6
6

Mr. Diaz did not chose Mr. Houston from a photo line-up. State's Ex. 26. However, Mr.
Diaz testified at trial that he was positive that Mr. Houston was the person in the "Yankees"
7

The police also spoke with Pablo Acevedo, who had accompanied Mr. Valenzuela
and Mr. Houston. R. 258 [420]. He said that he didn't know Mr. Valenzuela and Mr.
Houston, and that they had joined his group at Gold's Bar. IcL_ at 421. From there they
had all driven to Sociables. Id, He added that Mr. Valenzuela and Mr. Houston had a red
Ford Ranger. Id at 421-22.
While witnesses were being interviewed, the police noticed some fresh blood
drippings leading from the scene down the alleyway behind the businesses. R. 256 [158].
The blood stopped between two vehicles that were parked in the parking lot. Id_ 159.
There was also a blood smear along the wall in front of these vehicles. Id. 160. The
police collected photos and samples of this blood. R. 257 [251-52, 253-59, 287-88].
They also collected Mr. Rafael's clothing and took photographs of his clothing and his
wounds. Id. at 262-66.
Later, the police located the green Ford Ranger that the robbers had used to flee
the scene.7 There were spatters of blood inside and outside the truck. The police took
samples of this blood. R. 257 [278-83]. They also took photos of the truck. R. 258 [426].
The truck was registered to Mr. Houston. R. 257 [236].
After gathering blood samples from the scene, the victim's clothing, and the truck,
the samples were prepared for DNA testing. R. 257 [308-23]. A substantial blood sample

sweatshirt. R. 256 [163].
7

Mr. Houston's girlfriend, Stephanie Piep, provided the truck to police. R. 258 [425].
8

was taken from Mr. Houston to compare with the samples. R. 257 [293-94]. Through
DNA testing, police found that Mr. Houston's blood matched that on the steering wheel
of his truck, the wall facing the parking lot at Sociables, Mr. Duran's shirt, and Mr.
Duran's pants.8 Also, Mr. Houston had a large open cut between the thumb and
forefinger of his right hand. State's Ex. 21.
Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela were charged with the crime. R. 3-5.
Mr. Valenzuela gave the police an interview. He told them that, at Sociables, Mr.
Houston had approached him in the bathroom and had said "that a guy out there had lots
of money, or had some money." R. 258 [432]. Mr. Valenzuela had asked, ,f[s]o, what, do
you want to jack him?" Id. Mr. Houston had replied, "I'm down for whatever." Id. Mr.
Valenzuela said that he then went back out into the bar, but worried that Mr. Houston
was too "antsy" and needed to relax. Id. at 433. Soon after, he looked around and did not
see Mr. Houston in the bar. Id. He said that he went outside and found Mr. Houston in a
physical confrontation with Mr. Duran. Id. at 433-34. Mr. Houston had a knife. Id. at
435. Mr. Valenzuela started towards Mr. Duran, and Mr. Duran said, "[w]hat, you too?"
Id. at 434. Then Mr. Valenzuela punched Mr. Duran. Id. At that point, he "looked a little
woozy" and fell down. Id. Mr. Valenzuela and Mr. Houston ran to their truck and drove
8

These samples were labeled Ql through Q6. Sample Ql was taken from the steering
wheel of the truck. R. 257 [339]. Q2 was taken from the wall at Sociables. Id at 340. Q3 was
another stain from the wall. Id. at 341. Q4 was taken from Mr. Duran's shirt. Id Q5 was taken
from Mr. Duran's other shirt (he had been wearing two shirts). Id And, Q6 was takenfromMr.
Duran's pants. Id at 342. DNA profiles were made for each of these samples, and the profiles
matched the DNA profile of Mr. Houston's blood. R. 257 [351-52].
9

away. Id. at 435. Mr. Valenzuela said that, as Mr. Houston drove, a cut on his right hand
was spurting blood.9
Later, under oath at Mr. Houston's trial, Mr. Valenzuela testified differently. He
said that he was the one who had borrowed Mr. Duran's cell phone, R. 256 [136], and
that it was he who went outside with the phone. Id_ He also testified that Mr. Duran
followed him outside, but that Mr. Houston did not join them. Id. Then Mr. Valenzuela
started fighting with Mr. Duran. Id. Mr. Valenzuela testified that he had a knife, and he
stabbed Mr. Duran and took his money. Id. at 137-38, 150. Then Mr. Houston came out,
and he and Mr. Houston got into the Ford Ranger and sped away. Id_ at 138. Mr.
Valenzuela said that he kept most of the money. Id. at 150-51.
The jury convicted Mr. Houston of aggravated robbery, R. 206, but did not find
that the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Houston had used a knife
in the crime. R. 205. Mr. Houston was sentenced to five years to life in prison. R. 22627.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Houston's conviction should be reversed because the State didn't bring Mr.
Houston to trial within 120 days of his written request for 120-day disposition. And,
while delays may be justified by good cause, there was not good cause for any of the
9

R. 258 [435-36]. Before his trial, Mr. Valenzuela accepted a plea bargain and pled guilty
to the charge of second degree felony robbery. R. 256 [148].
10

delays that in this case. There were three delays.
First, a delay was caused when the prison failed to transport Mr. Houston to the
continuation of the preliminary hearing on January 16, 2002. The preliminary hearing
had started the day before, but was continued to the next day when time ran short. R. 255
[44]. Then, when court reconvened on the 16th, it was discovered that the prison had
refused to transport Mr. Houston. Id. at 46. So, the continuation was rescheduled for
January 24th. IcL at 47-50. Although this delay is not the fault of the prosecutor or trial
court, the time still counts towards the 120 days because it was an administrative error,
and such errors do not toll the 120 days. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998).
The second delay was caused by the State's filing of a "Motion for a Joint Trial
with Dual Juries." R. 31-39. In the Motion the State asked that Mr. Houston be tried with
his co-defendant even though the co-defendant had given a confession that implicated
Mr. Houston. R. 31-32. This necessitated the appointment of conflict counsel for either
Mr. Houston or his co-defendant, and this caused a 14-day postponement of the
arraignment. R. 259. So, the delay is attributable to the State, and so the delay does not
toll the 120-day period.
The third delay was also caused by the State. This is because the State wanted to
present expert witness testimony at trial, but had neglected to give Mr. Houston the
statutorily-required 30-day notice. R. 272 [4]. To mend this, the State asked for a
continuance to allow the 30 days to pass. IcL The defense counsel strongly objected

11

because he wished to preserve Mr. Houston's request for disposition within 120 days. Id_
at 7, 12-13. However, the trial court granted the continuance. Id. at 17-18. The trial was
then rescheduled for April 24 th through the 26th, more than a month from the original
March 13th through the 15th dates. IdL at 18-19.
None of these delays is supported by good cause because they were not caused by
the defendant or by unforeseen circumstances near the trial date. And, under the case
law, these are the only justifications for a late trial. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,
Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. In these circumstances, this case should have been dismissed under the
120-day disposition statute.

ARGUMENT
MR, HOUSTON'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE STATE DID NOT BRING HIM TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS OF
HIS REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF THE CHARGE
The State failed to prosecute Mr. Houston within 120 days after he requested
disposition of the charge. In fact, not only did the State fail to prosecute within 120 days,
it actually caused two of the three delays which resulted in the late trial. So, the late trial
cannot be justified and the trial court should have dismissed the charge against Mr.
Houston. This is shown by the law.
The controlling law is the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1

12

(1999). This statute stems from federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial,10
and is meant to "more precisely define what is meant by speedy t r i a l . . . . " State v.
Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^[6, 18 P.3d 504 (citations omitted). More practically, the
statute also prevents law enforcers from "holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed
of charges against him." L± (citations omitted). Further, it compels prompt prosecution,11
and encourages trials "while witnesses are available and their memories are fresh."
Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^[6 (citations omitted).
These goals are implicit in the words of the statute. The statute provides that,
whenever a prisoner has a pending charge, the prisoner may compel the prosecutor to try
him within 120 days by delivering a written request to the warden or other authorized
person:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there
is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it
is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of
delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested,
10

State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Tavlor. 538 P.2d 310, 313
(Utah 1975).
11

Viles, 702 P.2d at 1176.
13

to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so
notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) & (2) (1999).
Besides outlining the procedure for making a 120-day disposition request, this
statute also makes clear that, once the request is made, the prosecutor has the burden of
pushing the case forward to meet the deadline. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^|14,
34 P.3d 790; State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). This means that the State
may not stand passively by while clerical errors delay the case, or while time simply
passes. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The State must schedule all
necessary appearances within the 120-day period, and inform the court that prompt
scheduling is necessary because of the 120-day disposition notice. Coleman. 2001 UT
App 281, ^[14; Petersen, 810 P.2d 425. The State must also actively avoid delays, and if
the delays are necessary, the State must minimize them. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,
K14; Petersen, 810 P.2d 425.
Of course, the prosecutor's duty to try the case within 120 days is not absolute.
The 120-day disposition statute allows for delays that have good cause. The statute says:
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). The question becomes, therefore, whether any

14

delays are supported by good cause. This has been the principal issue in several appeals
under the 120-day disposition statute, and some general guidelines have emerged. Most
importantly, it has been determined that a good-cause delay is one that is either: (1)
caused by the defendant, or (2) "a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems
arising immediately prior to trial." Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^[14; Petersen. 810 P.2d
at 426.
As a practical matter, some good-cause delays have included those caused by
defendants' motions,12 those made to accommodate defense counsels' schedules,13 and
those caused by defendants' requests for continuances. State v. Phathammavong. 860
P.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bullock . 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah
1985). On the other hand, delays that do not have good cause, and therefore do not
justify bringing a defendant to trial after the 120-day period, include those caused by
court administrative errors,14 those caused by a prosecutor's inaction,15 and those caused
by a prosecutor's passive acceptance of delayed scheduling. Coleman. 2001 UT App
281,^14.
Once a trial court determines whether a delay is justified by good cause, it must

12

State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

13

Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1|8.

14

Heaton,958P.2dat915.

15

Petersen. 810 P.2d at 426.
15

determine whether to go to trial or dismiss the case. The statute mandates that cases with
unjustifiable delays be dismissed:
In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves
to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999).
If the trial court tries a case after the 120-day period has elapsed, the issue of
whether there was good cause for the delay may be reviewed on appeal. Appellate review
of such an issue involves a two-step process. First, it should be determined when the
120-day period commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the
120-day period, it must be determined whether "good cause" excused the delay.
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Heaton. 958 P.2d at 916. If it did not, the conviction
must be reversed whether there is a showing of prejudice or not. Petersen . 810 P.2d at
427.
In this case, the first step of the process, determining when the 120-day period
commenced and when it ended, is easy. That is because it was undisputed below that the
120-day period began on December 14, 2001, and ended 120 days later on April 12,
2002. R. 85-87, 271 [6], 272 [18]. Further, a review of the record shows that this
stipulation is soundly based. The "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
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Charge[s]M was executed on December 8, 2001, and was stamped "received" by the
prison records office on December 14, 2001. R. 13. The 120-day period, therefore, began
December 14th because delivery to an authorized agent at the prison triggers the 120-day
period.16 Taking this date, then, and adding 120 days shows that the deadline was April
12, 2001.17
However, the trial did not occur until April 24, 2002, twelve days past the 120-day
deadline. So, under the second step of the test, it must be determined whether good cause
justified the lateness of the trial. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[6.
There were three separate delays in this case, and none of them were justified by
good cause. This will be shown in the three sub-sections below. The first sub-section
shows that the first delay, which was caused by the prison's failure to transport Mr.
Houston to the continuation of the preliminary hearing, R. 255 [46-47], did not toll the
120-day period. The second sub-section shows that the second delay was caused by the
State's poorly-timed Motion for a Joint Trial. R. 31-39. Because State-caused delays are
not supported by good cause under the 120-day statute, this delay did not toll the 120-day
period. The third sub-section shows that the third delay was caused by the State's failure
to give the statutorily-required 30-day notice of expert testimony at trial, R. 272 [5-7],
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999); Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, %6 n.7; Heaton, 958
P.2dat916.
17

2001 was not a leap year. See http://iavascript.internet.com/calculators/leap-vear.html
(calculating whether any given year is a leap year).
17

and so the 120-day period was not tolled during this delay.
In these circumstances, the late trial cannot be justified, and Mr. Houston's
conviction should be reversed. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for thorough
findings and conclusions regarding the first and second delays in this case, and whether
they had good cause.

A. The First Delay was Caused by an Administrative Error and does not
Toll the 120-dav Period
The first delay, which occurred between January 16 th and 24th, was not justified
because it was due to the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston to a hearing, and this
was not Mr. Houston's fault.18 Therefore, the 120-day period was not tolled between the
16th and 24th.
It all began on the first day of the preliminary hearing, which was January 15,
2002. R. 255. The court heard testimony from two witnesses, and then had to leave. The
court suggested reconvening at lunchtime. Id. at 44. However, neither the State nor the
defense could meet then. IcL. The judge then suggested reconvening on January 24 th , but
the State informed the court that a 120-day disposition request had been received and it
wished to reconvene as soon as possible. Id. at 45. So, the continuance was scheduled for
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See Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^6 ("A finding of good cause that will excuse failure
of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within the time required means (1) delay caused by
the defendant - such as asking for a continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused by
unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial.'1) (quotations omitted).
18

the following morning, January 16 . Id.
Unfortunately, the prison did not transport Mr. Houston for the continuance. Id_ at
46-47. In discussing a new date for the continuance, the court noted that a number of jury
trials were coming up, and again suggested reconvening on January 24 th . Id at 47. This
time the State readily agreed, and the date was set. IdL at 47-48. On the 24th, the
continuance was held and Mr. Houston was bound over. IcL at 50, 93-94.
The delay between the 16th and 24th must be counted towards the 120-day period
because it was not a good-cause delay. In other words, it was not a delay caused by Mr.
Houston. Further, the delay was not caused by an unforeseen problem arising
immediately before trial. Indeed, this delay occurred well before trial and was not even
necessarily unforeseen because the prison needs more than one day's notice to transport a
prisoner. Id at 46.
What is more, the Utah Supreme Court has already settled the question of whether
administrative errors such as this toll the 120 days. Specifically, they do not. Heaton., 958
P.2d at 915. This is because the 120-day disposition statute places the burden of moving
the case forward solely on the prosecutor. IcL This has been emphasized by the case law.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Heaton. the Court considered the issue
of whether a delay caused by a court clerk's neglect in failing to docket the case was
supported by good cause. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. The Court determined that it was not
because the prosecutor has a duty to compel the case forward regardless of such glitches:
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The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never
been considered dispositive because to hold that good cause is supported
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecution.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. The Court also noted that, while administrative mistakes are
regrettable, the prosecutor's office must operate independently of administrative
agencies. IdL It must work on its own to push the case forward. Id.
The recent case of State v. Coleman is also on point. In that case, the defendant
had made a routine request for a delay of the preliminary hearing. Coleman, 2001 UT
App 281, TJ14. A 120-day disposition notice filed by the defendant had not yet been
received, and the prosecutor agreed to the delay. Id. Upon review, this Court found that
the State did not take its responsibility to move the case forward seriously enough:
the prosecution, knowing that it had or could soon have an obligation to
bring the matter to trial within 120 days, may not passively accept a
defendant's delay of the preliminary hearing, and then turn around and
claim the delay kept the prosecution from meeting its burden.
Id. So, even when it has not received a 120-day disposition request, the prosecution still
has some measure of responsibility to move the case forward.
Other cases, such as State v. Petersen19 and State v. Taylor20 have also recognized
that the 120-day disposition statute places the burden of moving the case forward on the
prosecutor. Administrative glitches or not, the prosecutor must still bring the defendant
19

Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426.

20

Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13.
20

to trial within 120 days. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). It is only those delays
caused by the defendant or by unforeseen problems just before trial that toll the 120 days.
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[6. And, the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston in
this case does not fall into either of these categories.
Nobody denies that the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston was not the
prosecutor's fault. However, as explained in Coleman and Heaton, that is not the point.
The prosecutor still has the responsibility of moving the case along, and administrative
errors do not relieve the prosecutor of this burden. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. Therefore,
this time counts towards the 120 days and, along with the other delays, shows that Mr.
Houston's conviction should be reversed.21

B. The Second Delay was Caused by the State's Motion for Joint Trial with
Dual Juries, so it is not Justified by Good Cause
The second delay that occurred in this case also does not toll the 120 days because
it was a delay caused by the State. The State, on the day of the arraignment, February 11,
2002, filed a motion requesting that Mr. Houston be tried jointly with his co-defendant,

21

Notably, the trial court did not make any legal or factual findings regarding this delay.
R. 271 [6-8]; 272 [10-14]. However, the record of facts on this point is thorough, R. 255 [44-50],
and the determination of whether the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston constitutes good
cause for a delay is a legal determination. See Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915 (whether administrative
errors constitute good cause requires an interpretation of 77-29-1(4)). Therefore, this Court may
properly reach this question.
However, should this Court determine that more facts are needed, Mr. Houston requests
that this case be remanded for further findings and conclusions regarding this delay.
21

Gabriel Valenzuela. R. 31-39. This necessitated a continuance of the arraignment so that
either Mr. Houston or Mr. Valenzuela could be appointed conflict counsel.
The reason conflict counsel was required was that the State's motion had placed
Mr. Houston's interests in immediate conflict with Mr. Valenzuela's. Mr. Valenzuela had
given the police a confession implicating Mr. Houston, R. 256 [140-48], and such a
circumstance presents unique constitutional and evidentiary issues. In such
circumstances, each defendant must have uncompromised, independent advice. So, Mr.
Houston and Mr. Valenzuela could no longer both be represented by the Salt Lake Legal
Defender's Association, as they had to that point.22
Notwithstanding, the trial court found that the 120 days were tolled during this
period of time. R. 271 [6]. The court did not attribute the delay to either party, but held
that, because the appointment of conflict counsel was necessary, the delay was
reasonable:
there was a delay at the arraignment because there needed to be conflict
counsel. And again, I don't know that it is necessary that I actually attribute
to one side or the other what the delay was, but it is clear that with the two
defendants still pending trial that there needed to be a conflict counsel. And
that certainly does not unreasonably delay the case.23
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State v. Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d
65, 72-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Houston was represented by David P.S. Mack of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Association, R. 9, and Mr. Valenzuela was represented by Patrick L.
Anderson of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. R. 255 [2].
23

R. 271 [6]. The court made a similar statement in the March 11th hearing wherein the
State asked for a continuance. R. 272 [11]. Besides that, there are no other findings to review on
this point. The record does contain some Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 133-36,
22

The trial court's ruling is faulty for two reasons. First, the trial court applied the
wrong standard in deciding to toll the 120 days. Second, and most importantly, the court
did not take into consideration the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel.24
The court's first error, applying the reasonableness standard instead of the "good
cause1' standard, is demonstrated by the 120-day disposition statute. Under the 120-day
disposition statute, continuances may be granted only for "good cause shown in open
court...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). In the next paragraph, the statute again
says that a delay cannot be justified without the support of "good cause." Utah Code

but since they are unsigned, unstamped, and undated, they cannot be considered court-issued.
There was some discussion about these findings and conclusions at the April 22nd hearing, but
they were never signed and filed. R. 271 [8-9]. Appellate counsel attempted to supplement the
record with signed, stamped, and dated findings and conclusions, and this Court issued an order
for the supplementation, R. 268, but no such document was added to the record. R. 259-70.
Appellate counsel was informed by the third district appellate clerk that this was not found in the
record. So, the only findings and conclusions that may be reviewed in this case are those made
orally by the trial court at the March 11th and April 22nd hearings. R. 271 [6-9]; 272 [10-18].
24

The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424
("Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.") This is because, as a matter of law, the court
applied a reasonableness standard rather than the correct, "good cause" standard which is
required by the 120-disposition statute and the interpretive case law. R. 271 [6]; Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999); Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. And, while
the overall issue in this case is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the trial court does "not have
discretion to misapply the law." Colemaa 2001 UT App 281, Tfl7 n.l 1 (quotations omitted).
Further, the court made nofindingsof fact on this point. So, the clearly erroneous
standard is not applied. Of course, the court should have made factual findings because such
findings are helpful in determining whether this delay was attributable to Mr. Houston. Id. at ^6.
The record contains enough information, though, to demonstrate that this delay was not caused
by Mr. Houston.
Nonetheless, should this Court determine that the record is insufficient, this case should
be remanded for findings on this point.
23

Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). The only time reasonableness is mentioned in the statute is
when it indicates that the continuance may be for a "reasonable" length of time. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). But this refers, of course, to the length of the
continuance, not the justification for the continuance. Id. So, the "good cause" standard,
rather than the "reasonableness" standard, should have been applied.
This is further supported by the case law. This Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have repeatedly emphasized that it is the "good cause" standard which applies in cases
like this. Without exception, this is the standard which has been used to determine
whether a delay tolls the 120-day period, and the standard has never been confused with
a reasonableness standard or otherwise diluted.25 And, as has already been noted, the
good-cause standard justifies a delay only if it was caused by the defendant, or by
unforseen problems arising just before trial. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^}6; Petersen,
810 P.2d at 426. Other matters are inconsequential unless they are related to these
questions in some way.
With this, the trial court's second error becomes apparent. That is, the trial court
did not take into account the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel and the
postponement of the arraignment. In fact, the court even said that it didn't find it
necessary to attribute this delay to the actions of "one side or the other." R. 271 [6]. This
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Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915; Petersen. 810 P.2d at 425; State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53,
H8, 42 P.3d 1258; Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Pathammavong. 860 P.2d at 1005; Maestas.
815P.2datl321.
24

was error because the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel and the
postponement of the arraignment was crucial to the determination of whether the delay
was justified by good cause. If the delay was caused by Mr. Houston, it was supported by
good cause. If it was caused by anyone other than Mr. Houston, the 120-day period
should not have been tolled. And, a review of the record shows that this delay was not
caused by Mr. Houston.
The record shows that, until the originally-scheduled arraignment on February
11th, Mr. Houston had been prosecuted with his co-defendant, Gabriel Valenzuela.26 The
Information listed them as co-defendants, R. 3, and both were appointed attorneys from
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. R. 9, 255 [2]. The preliminary hearing was
held jointly, R. 255 [4], and both men were bound over. IdL_ at 93. The arraignment for
both was scheduled for February 11 th . R. 259.
However, on February 11th, the State filed a "Motion for Joint Trial with Dual
Juries." R. 31-39. This immediately placed the interests of Mr. Houston and Mr.
Valenzuela in conflict because Mr. Valenzuela had given a confession which implicated
Mr. Houston in this crime. R. 31, 256 [138-148]. In these circumstances, trials are
usually held separately. Then, the out-of-court confession is not admitted at the trial of
the non-confessing defendant unless the confessor appears in court for cross26

This joint prosecution was, at that point, permissible under section 77-8a-l of the Utah
Code, which provides that defendants may be charged in the same Information "if they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(2)(b) (1999).
25

examination. Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). This is because such
confessions are "inevitably suspect1' and they cannot be brought to the jury's attention
without, at the very least, the opportunity to cross-examine the confessor. IcL_ at 136. In
Utah, in fact, such defendants may not be tried together without an explicit court order
allowing the procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(3)(a) (1999). And so it was not
foreseeable that the State would wish to try Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela together, or
that it would file the Motion on the day of the arraignment.
After the State filed its Motion for a Joint Trial with Dual Juries, however, an
immediate conflict arose between Mr. Houston and his co-defendant. On one hand, Mr.
Houston's right to the confrontation of the witnesses against him stood to be
compromised by Mr. Valenzuela's out-of-court confession emphasizing that Mr.
Houston was the more culpable person in the crime. R. 256 [140-46]. On the other hand,
it was in Mr. Valenzuela's interest to admit the confession and possibly obtain a more
favorable verdict or sentence.27 This conflict necessitated the immediate need for the
appointment of conflict counsel for either Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela because each
needed uncompromised, independent advice on everything from trial strategy, to plea
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In fact, Mr. Valenzuela did obtain a more favorable circumstance. He accepted the offer
of a second-degree robbery conviction, which was more favorable than the first-degree
aggravated robbery charge which he faced. R. 256 [148]; R. 3-4. At trial, he testified that he
blamed Mr. Houston for the crime M[t]o get a deal." Id. at 148.
26

officers, to evidence, and the arraignment.28 Accordingly, the arraignment was postponed
to allow for this.
All of this shows that, even though it was the defense who needed to arrange for
conflict counsel,29 this circumstances was necessitated by the State's unexpected filing of
its Motion for a Joint Trial. The State caused this delay. The State could have filed its
motion for a joint trial before the arraignment, thereby allowing conflict counsel to be
appointed in time for the scheduled arraignment. Or, it could have filed the motion after
the arraignment, thereby saving the need for a postponement. Indeed, it should have
taken one of these courses because it is responsible for moving the case along. Heaton .
958 P.2d at 915. However, the State filed its motion on the day of the arraignment, and
this necessitated a postponement. Days were lost in bringing Mr. Houston to trial, and
this delay is not attributable to Mr. Houston.
In sum, the 120-day period should not be tolled between the original arraignment
28

See Rule of Prof. Cond. 1.7 (2002) ("(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) The lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and (2) Each client consents after consultation, (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents
after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation to each client of the implications of the common
representation and the advantage and risks involved.")
29

In some cases a continuance granted to allow for the appointment of conflict counsel
tolls the 120 days because it is a delay attributable to the defense. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d at
1004; Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1321. But in this case that is not true; here it was the State which
caused this delay.
27

date of February 11 and the postponement date of February 25 th. This delay is not
attributable to Mr. Houston was necessitated by the State's arraignment-day filing of a
"Motion for a Joint Trial with Dual Juries.1' R. 31-39. So, this delay, along with the
others, shows that the late trial is not justifiable, and Mr. Houston's conviction should be
reversed.
Alternatively, Mr. Houston asks that this case be remanded for findings of fact
relevant to this delay. The trial court did not make such findings, R. 271 [6], and even
though the record contains enough information to demonstrate that this delay was not
caused by Mr. Houston, factual findings could more fully demonstrate this. Therefore, if
this Court decides not to reverse Mr. Houston's conviction, he asks that this case be
remanded for thorough findings.

C. The Third Delay was Caused by the State's Failure to Give the Required
Expert-Witness Notice, so it is not Justified by Good Cause
The third delay, which is the one which took the trial past the 120-day deadline,
was not justified by good cause. This is because it was not caused by Mr. Houston or by
unforeseen circumstances. It was caused by the State's request for a trial postponement
from the original dates of March 13 th, 14th, and 15th, R. 260, to April 24 th, 25th, and 26th.
R. 66. So, because State-caused delays are not justifiable, Mr. Houston's conviction must
be reversed.
The State asked for the postponement because it failed to give Mr. Houston the
28

statutorily-required 30-day notice that it intended to call an expert witness at trial. This
notice is required by section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code, and indicates that ffthe party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable
but not less than 30 days before t r i a l . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (1999). In
this case, the State did not send the notice of expert witnesses until February 27 th , 2002,
only fourteen days before the scheduled trial. R. 41-42.
This was brought to the court's attention at the pretrial conference on March 11 th .
R. 272 [4-5]. At that conference, the State asked for a continuance to allow for the
passage of the 30 days. IcL However, the defense counsel refused to agree, asserting that
Mr. Houston would not waive his right to be tried within 120 days. IcL at 12-13. The
defense counsel also pointed out that the State had possessed the experts' reports at least
from the time of the preliminary hearing,30 and there had been ample time to notify the
defense if it intended to call these witnesses. R. 272 [6-7]. But the State did not do this.
Id. In these circumstances, the defense counsel argued, the State should simply forego the
experts' testimonies. Id at 7.

3

The experts' reports, at least most of them, had been provided to the defense counsel at
the preliminary hearing. Id. at 9. However, providing the reports does not meet the statutory
requirements under section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code. This is because the reports themselves do
not inform the defense that this information will be presented at trial. The defense must be
specifically informed whether they will presented because the defense needs time to "examine
the testing procedures used by the experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire
[an] expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and
possibly impugn their qualifications." State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, ^8, 19 P.3d 400. So,
merely receiving the reports is inadequate under the statute. Id. at ^[19.
29

In evaluating these arguments, the court opined that the prosecution had shown
diligence by providing the expert notification two days after the arraignment. Id_ at 14.
So, the court ruled, the experts' testimonies should be allowed. Id. The only question, the
court said, was whether the defense would be prepared for the expert witnesses'
testimonies by the trial date. Id at 12. If not, the trial would be postponed to allow for the
30 days, and any resulting delay would be considered reasonable. Id. at 12-14.
The defense counsel disagreed with this view of the situation. He emphasized
again that Mr. Houston would not waive the 120-day disposition right or the notification
right, Id at 13, and expressed dismay at being forced to chose between the right to 120day disposition and the 30-day notice request. Id. at 16.
Nonetheless, the court said the expert testimony would be allowed, and that the
defense counsel needed to decide whether he wanted the 30 days to prepare or could
simply confront the expert at the already-scheduled trial. IcL at 13-14. The defense
counsel, after consultation with his office, said that he was not prepared to confront the
expert witnesses. Id at 16. But he also emphasized that the appropriate remedy here
would be either exclusion of the expert witnesses or a continuance within the 120-day
period. Id
The court then ruled that the trial would be postponed to allow for passage of the
30 days required by the expert witness notification statute. Id. at 17-18. The court based
this ruling on its finding that the State had not acted in bad faith:

30

It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude the testimony or the expert
witnesses based on the noncompliance with the 30 days because I just
simply did not find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the
30-day notice. The State has done it as quickly as they can in the trial
setting. And so by not excluding the testimony, or excluding the witnesses I
guess, by default, I guess that means I am granting the continuance and it is
to the requesting party.
Id at 17. Importantly, however, the court also acknowledged that this delay was
attributable to the State. Id at 17-18. Additionally, because Mr. Houston did not waive
the 120-day disposition right, the trial would be rescheduled as soon as possible. IdL at
17.
Unfortunately, the trial was scheduled for April 24 th, 25th, and 26th, days past the
April 12th deadline.31 Naturally, the defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss, R. 14348, and a hearing on the Motion was scheduled. At the hearing, the trial court incorrectly
used a reasonableness standard in determining that the delay was justified:
I need to weigh everything and decide what is reasonable and what is not
reasonable. And in fact that is why the findings that I need to make are not
just whether or not it was one party or the other who made a mistake, or
one party or the other who didn't comply. I need to be able to look at all of
the circumstances and see whether or not the delay is reasonable.
R. 271 [6]. Then, the trial court summarized its conclusions from the March 11 t h

31

To allow for 30 days between the notice of an expert witness and the trial, the trial
could not be scheduled until after March 29th. See R. 41-42 (30 days after the file date of
February 27th, 2002 was Friday, March 29th, 2002). The next week, which was thefirstweek of
April, was unavailable because the defense counsel was out of town. R. 272 [18]. Then, the
following week, the court was on the "mast arraignment calendar" and could not schedule the
trial. M. at 19. Friday of that week was April 12th, the last day of the 120 days. The court also
could not schedule trial the week of the 15th because it was on the "master pretrial calendar." Id.
at 19. So, the trial was scheduled for the 24th, 25th, and 26th. Id at 20.
31

conference, saying that it was not unreasonable to schedule trial beyond the 120-day
deadline because the defense counsel had needed to time to prepare for the expert
testimony. IdL at 7. Then, the trial court denied the Motion.32
The trial court's denial of the Motion was error. This is because, as with its
evaluation of the arraignment postponement, the trial court erroneously applied a
reasonableness standard, rather than the statutorily-mandated "good cause" standard. R.
271 [7-8]. Secondly, the trial court's interpretation of the requirements under the 30-day
expert-notice statute is incorrect. Finally, the trial court ignored options that would have
allowed Mr. Houston all of his constitutional rights, rather than requiring him to chose
between them.33
The first error, which was applying the incorrect reasonableness standard, is
particularly damaging. That is because this standard focuses merely on whether a delay is

32

R. 271 [8]. As noted in the previous sub-section, the State drafted somefindingsof fact
and conclusions of law on this subject, R. 130-32, but they were not signed or filed. So, they are
not included in this discussion.
33

The trial court's rulings on this delay should be reviewed for correctness because all of
the related rulings were interpretations of law. The court's application of a reasonableness
standard rather than the correct "good cause" standard was legal error, and the court's
interpretation of the requirements under the 30-day expert-notice requirement statute was a legal
determination. So, the correctness standard applies. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914 ("We review the
trial court's legal determinations for correctness."); Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[3 n.3 ("legal
determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which grants the trial court
discretion are reviewed for correctness."); Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424 ("Questions of law are
reviewed for correctness.")
32

understandable in light of the legal requirements. 34 But that is not the point; many types
34

In applying a reasonableness standard, the trial court considered factors relating to
whether the delay was understandable in the circumstances. R. 271 [7]. This is shown by, among
other things, the court's consideration of whether the prosecutor's filing of the notice was
"disingenuous," whether the circumstances in general showed bad faith, and whether Mr.
Houston wanted the 30 days to prepare for the expert testimony:
The expert discovery issue is a little bit more problematic just in that there are
some very specific statutory requirements that the State needs to make in order to
meet their discovery requirements. They are required to bring in an expert witness.
And again, Mr. Burmester apparently has met those requirements as far as giving
the explanation and even attempted to give all of the information as quickly as this
matter was set, but the matter was not set out 30 days. The first trial date was
within 20 days, so we technically could not make that 30-day notice requirement.
Now whether he could have provided that information, even before I had set it for
trial, is what Mr. Mack is arguing, and because of the fact that this has been
presumed that it was going, and it has looked like it was going to trial, the
defendant has wanted it to go to trial, and everybody has anticipated that it is
going to go to trial, is meaningful argument but I do not think it is reasonable to
say that it was not even bound over and any appearance before me and set for any
trial date. I am not finding that their failure to comply was disingenuous because
they really had to give what information they can and simply did not meet the
technical requirement of the 30-day notice because the trial was set sooner than 30
days.
They said they gave the information as quick as they could and even then the
remedy for that is not to keep out the evidence but the remedy for that is a
continuance. And I asked the defendant at that time, given the fact that we had
two conflicting issues for a delay, as whether he wanted the time to have that
expert testimony information, or if he wanted to stay the 120-day time period.
And Mr. Mack talked with his office, discussed it with Mr. Houston, looked into
the issues and determined that they did in fact need the time to correlate and
adequately prepare.
Again, that is not unreasonable, and again, it was not something that I am
therefore saying that the delay was on the part of the defendant. I am simply
looking at all of the circumstances and finding that under those facts, without
stating that the delay was specifically to the defendant, or specifically to the State,
that under all of those facts it was reasonable to give everyone time they needed to
meet the statutory requirements of expert notice, and that the delay was not
unreasonable to reset this trial.
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of delays could be understandable. Yet, that does not mean that they justify
compromising a defendant's speedy trial rights as they are articulated in the 120-day
disposition statute. Constitutionally and statutorily, the prosecutor has the burden of
moving a case forward, and this burden is not relieved simply because an understandable
delay arises. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999); Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915;
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424.
As has already been shown, it is the "good cause" standard, rather than a
reasonableness standard, which applies. The "good cause" standard is mandated in two
places in the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999).
Further, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently applied the "good
cause" standard in evaluations of delays.35 This means that delays are justified only if
they are caused by the defendant or unforseen problems arising just before trial.
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^[6; Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426.
Applying the good cause standard shows that the postponement of the trial was
not justified. This is because the postponement was not caused by Mr. Houston, it was
caused by the prosecutor's failure to give 30-day notice that it intended to call expert
witnesses at trial. R. 41-42, 271 [7-8], 272 [4-7]. Also, this was not an unforeseen
problem. The prosecutor was fully aware that, by statute, 30-day notice of expert
R.271 [7-8].
35

Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; Petersen. 810 P.2d at 425; Peterson. 2002 UT App 53,1J8;
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, T|6; Pathammavong. 860 P.2d at 1005; Maestas. 815 P.2d at 1321.
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testimony was required. R. 272 [4-5]; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999). He was also
aware that a request for 120-day disposition had been filed. R. 255 [44]. Knowing that he
had to meet both time-sensitive requirements, he should have sent the notice quickly and
worked to keep the trial within the 120-day period. However, he did not and this caused
the postponement of the trial from its original dates of March 13 th , 14th, and 15 th to April
24th, 25th, and 26th. This was days after the April 12th deadline, and so this case should
have been dismissed.
The trial court's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous not only because the court
applied the incorrect reasonableness standard, as shown above, but also because of a
second error it made in its evaluation. That is, the trial court erroneously interpreted the
requirements of the 30-day notification statute and relied upon this interpretation in
justifying the delay of the trial. R. 271 [7-8], 272 [10-12, 17-18].
The trial court's interpretation was that the trial postponement was justified
because trial was set only twenty days from the arraignment, and the prosecutor showed
good faith by sending notice of the expert witnesses only two days after the arraignment,
which occurred about a month after the bindover. R. 271 [7-8]. So, the trial court said,
delaying the trial to allow the defense its time to prepare for the testimony was
reasonable. R. 272 [17-18].
However, this reasoning is unsound. The notification statute does not allow a
party to wait until after the arraignment, the trial scheduling, or any other event before
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providing notice of the expert witness. Indeed, the statute does not tie the notification to
any of these events. The statute merely provides that, in any event, a party intending to
call an expert witness must give the opposing party notice at least 30 days before trial,
and the notice must include the expert's name, address, resume, and report:
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the
hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.36

36

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999). Subsequent sections outline the procedure once
the expert notification is received:
(2)(a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed testimony,
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any
opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the
expert shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's
anticipated testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the
expert when available.
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name and
address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a
report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other party,
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or
in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the
rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare
to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal
36

Further, giving the opposing counsel a copy of the experts' reports, as the
prosecutor did in this case, does not qualify as notice under the statute. Tolano , 2001 UT
App 37, Tfl9; State v.Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This is
because merely providing the report does not inform the opposing party that the expert
will be called. Indeed, several experts, one expert, or no experts may produce reports for
a case. However, this does not mean that any experts will testify, and "it is not
defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet undisclosed expert
witnesses . . . . " Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, ^fl 1 (citation omitted). So, only a 30-day
notification that an expert will be called, along with the expert's name, address, resume,
and report, qualifies under the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999).
Here, the prosecutor gave the defense counsel the experts' reports at the
preliminary hearing. These reports included Gabriel Bier's blood evidence report and
Todd Wrigley's DNA report, which were listed later in the "Notification of Expert
Witness."37 Handing the defense counsel the reports, of course, did not meet the
notification requirement because there was no notice stating that the experts would be

expert when available.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(2) & (3) (1999).
37

The "Notice of Expert Witnesses" listed two experts: 1) Todd M. Rigley of the Utah
Bureau of Forensic Services, who would testify about the DNA analysis, and 2) J. Gabriel Bier of
the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services, who would testify about the blood evidence. R. 41. At the
preliminary hearing, the prosecutor said he had given these reports to the defense counsel, and
identified the experts by name. R. 272 [9].
37

called as witnesses, plus the names, addresses, and resumes of the experts were not
complete. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999); Tolano . 2001 UT App 37, ^[11.
Importantly, however, the fact that the prosecutor handed the defense counsel
these reports shows that the prosecutor could have given proper notice as early as the
preliminary hearing, which was nearly two months before the original trial dates.
R. 272 [4-7]. But he did not. Id.
This is not a case where an unforeseen convergence of dates placed the State in
the impossible position of giving up this case either under the 120-day disposition
statute, or under the 30-day notification statute. The State knew that both statutes were in
play, and it could have, and should have, given notice of the expert witness as soon as
possible to avoid going past the 120-day deadline. Indeed, if it is held that this is not
required, then the speedy trial rights of the 120-day disposition statute would be crippled.
The State could always avoid the 120-day deadline by waiting until just before trial to
file a notice of expert witnesses. The defense counsel would then be required to forfeit
either speedy trial or due process rights, and this is contrary to the purposes of the 120day disposition and 30-day notification statutes, as well as basic fairness. This
circumstance should not be created.
It is true that the appropriate remedy for failing to give the 30-day notification is a
continuance to allow the opposing party time to prepare for the expert testimony:
(4)(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial
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or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony,
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result
of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose
appropriate sanctions.
However, even though this language mandates a continuance where the 30-day notice
requirement is not met by a party, it also "leaves some discretion with the trial court to
consider the circumstances

" Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, ^[8. So, if another

constitutional right, such as the right to a speedy trial, is involved in the case, the court
should use its discretion to seek a solution which protects both rights. As the United
States Supreme Court has declared, "we find it intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."39
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4) (1999). Thefinalsection of the statute addresses expert
testimony at preliminary hearings:
(5)(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice
of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial
testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary
hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall
provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as
practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an
expert witness.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5) (1999).
39

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In Simmons, the criminal
defendant motioned to suppress evidence. Id. at 381. In order to establish standing to make the
motion, the defendant testified that he was the owner of some of the items of evidence. Id. He
lost the motion to suppress, and the prosecutor entered his testimony as evidence at trial. Id. The
United States Supreme Court held that this was intolerable because it forced the defendant to
chose between his Fourth Amendment rights and the right to be free from self-incrimination.
39

Nonetheless, this is precisely what the trial court did. The trial court asked Mr.
Houston to chose between his speedy trial and due process rights, as they are enunciated
in the 120-day disposition and 30-day notification statutes. R. 272 [17-18]. This was
inappropriate in these circumstances, particularly in light of the availability of other
options that would preserve both Mr. Houston's rights.
The trial court's failure to consider these options was its third evaluative error in
the ruling on the trial postponement. These options included either: (1) foregoing the
State's expert testimony, or (2) continuing trial after the 30 days pass but before the 120day deadline. The defense counsel, in objecting to infringement upon either the 120-day
speedy trial right or the 30-day expert notification right, outlined both of these options to
the trial court.
However, the trial court would not consider foregoing the expert testimony. R.
272 [12-13]. And then the trial court did not even schedule the trial before the 120-day
deadline. This was partly because the defense counsel was out of town for the first week
after the 30 days had passed, and partly the court was unavailable for the next two weeks.
R. 272 [18-19]. Admittedly, delays made in part to accommodate defense counsels'
schedules are often considered justified by good cause. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,
^fl 1. But here, the fact that the defense counsel was out of town for the first week after
the 30-day notification period does not toll the 120 days. This is because the
postponement itself was caused by the State's failure to file the required 30-day notice.
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R. 41-42; 271 [7-8]; 272 [4-7]. If not for the State's oversight, the postponement would
not have been necessary, and the defense counsel's schedule would have been irrelevant.
Further, the trial court was more at fault than the defense counsel because it had conflicts
for both the second or third weeks in April. R. 272 [18]. So, the period between the
originally-scheduled trial dates and the time of trial should be included in the calculation
of the 120-day time period.
In sum, the trial court's conclusion that the postponement of the trial was a
justifiable delay is error. None of the three delays in this trial, the postponement of the
preliminary hearing continuance, the postponement of the arraignment, or the
postponement of the trial, met the requirements for tolling the 120-days. So, Mr.
Houston's conviction should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Houston respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction for failure to prosecute within 120 days after the written request for
disposition of charges. Alternatively, Mr. Houston requests that this case be remanded
for further factual findings and conclusions on the first and second delays that occurred
in this case.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011918410 FS

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,
Defendant
Custody: USP

Judge:
Date:

ANN BOYDEN
July 1, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
patd
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MACK, DAVID
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 8, 1979
Video
Tape Number:
VIDEO
Tape Count: 93234
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/26/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

*N I V .

Case No: 011918410
Date:
Jul 01, 2002

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
PRISON SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECTIVELY WITH TIME NOW SERVING AT UTAH
STATE PRISON,
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
RECOMMEND CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED AT ADC FROM 10-30-01

SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
RESTITUTION TO BE PAID THRU BOARD OF PARDONS OF $50,302.32 JOINT &
SEVERAL
Dated this

3

day of

^^cA^

20 4Z .

4^.

ANN B O Y D E N 7
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

THE TRIAL

77-17-13

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute did not prevent jurors from separation for purposes of necessity, such as to visit
tfoon recess
lavatory, and, while defendant's right to have
Requirements.
jury secluded from outside influences while
Separation.
deliberating should be jealously guarded, law
must have been construed in keeping with
ffoon recess.
* Excusing of jurors for noon hour after conclu- correlative rights of defendant and jurors. State
sion of arguments of counsel was not a separa- v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Where only separation of jury was for purtion after the case was submitted to them.
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 R2d 494 pose of necessity, under surveillance of bailiff,
and there was no communication with any
(1962).
juror, prejudice would not be presumed. State v.
Requirements.
Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Statute contained two requirements: (1) that
Where the separation of a jury was for the
jury be kept together in some private and
purposes of necessity, under surveillance of
convenient place, and (2) that no one be permitbailiff, and there was no communication with
ted to speak or communicate with jurors withany juror, prejudice would not be presumed and
out permission of court State v. Jarrett, 112
the burden was on the defendant to establish
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
that he was prejudiced by the alleged separation. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355
Separation.
Not every separation of a juror gave rise to P.2d 689 (1960), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82
claim of prejudice, since absolute isolation was S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d 137, appeal dismissed,
not reasonably possible. State v. Jarrett, 112 368 U.S. 144, 82 S. Ct. 247, 7 L. Ed. 2d 188
(1961).
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
ANALYSIS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d.— 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1647
et seq.
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1362.
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect, in criminal case,
of communications between witnesses and jurors, 9 A.L.R.3d 1275.
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial
in state criminal case during its progress as

ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46
A.L.R.4th 11.
Criminal law: propriety of reassembling jury
to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change
verdict after jury has been discharged, or has
reached or sealed its verdict and separated, 14
A.L.R.5th 89.

77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be
committed.
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at any
time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the custody of
the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 8 C.J.S. Bail § 136.

77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing
673

77-17-13

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the
hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony.
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when
available.
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other
party.
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall
impose appropriate sanctions.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by
the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the experts
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at
which the expert may be called as an expert witness.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 139, § 3; 1999, ch. 43, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective Ma> 3, 1999, inserted "held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Cnmi-

nal Procedure" m Subsection (l)(a), divided
Subsections (1) to (4), adding (a) and (b) designations, made two stylistic changes in Subsec
tion (3)(a), and added Subsection (5)
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77-17-13

THE JUDGMENT
NOTES TO DECISIONS

pert's report until the afternoon of the first day
of the trial, the trial court erred in denying a
continuance and allowing the expert's testimony. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Effect of noncompliance.
Expert's report.
Failure to provide notice.
—Harmless error.

Failure t o provide notice.
Effect of n o n c o m p l i a n c e .
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance based
on the state's failure to comply with the expert
witness notice requirement of this section.
State v. Arellano, 964 R2d 1167 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
Expert's report.
In a prosecution for sexual abuse, where the
state failed to provide defendant with an ex-

— H a r m l e s s error.
Although the state failed to disclose an expert witness to the defendant at least 30 days
before trial as required by this section, the
error was harmless where the expert's testimony was merely cumulative of other properly
entered and unchallenged testimony and the
outcome of the trial would not have been different had the expert not testified. State v.
Bredehofl, 966 R2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4.
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-6.5.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.
77-18-8.3.

Suspension of sentence — Pleas
held in abeyance — Probation
— Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings — Electronic
monitoring.
Repealed.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence — Term — Construction.
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death — Defendant to select method — Time
of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a lien.
Liability of rescued person for
costs of emergency response.
Costs imposed on defendant —
Restrictions.
Fine not paid — Commitment.
Special condition of sentence
during incarceration — Penalty.

Section
77-18-8.5,
77-18-9.
77-18-10.

77-18-11.

77-18-12.

77-18-13.
77-18-14.

77-18-15.
77-18-16.
77-18-17.
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Special condition of probation —
Penalty.
Definitions.
Petition — Expungement of
records of arrest, investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing
fee.
Petition — Expungement of
conviction — Certificate of eligibility — Fee — Notice —
Written evaluation — Objections — Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate
of eligibility — Effect of prior
convictions.
Hearing — Standard of proof —
Exception.
Order to expunge — Distribution of order — Redaction —
Receipt of order — Administrative proceedings — Division requirements.
Retention of expunged records
— Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

ADDENDUM C

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-1

CHAPTER 29
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST
PRISONERS
Section
77-29-1.

77-29-2.
77-29-3.
77-29-4.
77-29-5.

Prisoner's demand for disposition
of pending charge — Duties of
custodial officer — Continuance
may be granted — Dismissal of
charge for failure to bring to
trial.
Duty of custodial officer to inform
prisoner of untried indictments
or informations.
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.

Section
77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.
77-29-9.
77-29-10.
77-29-11.

Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to cooperate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law.
Interstate agreement — Escape of
prisoner while in temporary
custody.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
warden.
Interstate agreement — Attorney
general as administrator and
information agent.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
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